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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
NATIONAL FINANCE
COMPANY OF UTAH
Plaintiff ~and Respondent,

Case No. 913'7

vs.
CARLOS J. VALDEZ
Defendant ~and Appel,lant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS

A re-statement of the facts appears necessary
in some particulars. The defendant and his wife
obtained a loan from the plaintiff in March 1957
in the sum of $1920.00 and they executed a note
and chattel mortgage as security, and at the same
time the defendant Carlos J. Valdez, executed and
delivered to the plaintiff a written statement concerning his financial condition. That said financial
statement purported to be and was represented to
be a complete statement as to the said Carlos J.
1
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Valdez's financiai condition on the date of the loan,
to-wit, March 21, 195'7.
The defendant Carlos J. Valdez filed a voluntary
petition in bankruptcy in August 1957. Plaintiff
filed su!t in November 1957 to foreclose the mortgage, and alleged in its complaint facts to indicate
this liability was not affected by a bankruptcy disch·arge because i't was a liability founded upon false
pretenses and false representations. The false pretenses and false representations were set forth in
detail. The defendant answered setting up as an affirm·ative defense the discharge in bankruptey of
the 'defendant C·arlos J. Valdez. The case came on
'for pre-tria:l at which time the prayer of plaintiff's
complaint was amended 'to include the following:
"That the court determine the claim herein sued
upon be declared non-dischargeable in bankruptcy".
The defendants stipulated for judgment against
Rebecca ·M. Valdez, one of the defen·dants, and the
Court at pre-trial after admissions by the parties
found the only issues to be determined were; 1.
Whether or not the court may under the pieadings
as they are amended, find and enter an order tha't
the obliga:tion in question was not dischargeable
in view of the proVisinns of Section t7-2 Federal
Bankruptcy Act. Pre Trial Order 13.
Wh.en the case came on for trial the defendant
again raised the bankruptcy of the defendant Carlos
2
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J. Valdez by motion to stay proceedings, and argued
that the Plaintiff had misconceived its remedy. R-17.
The Court's attention was called to the facts
admitted at pre-trial - that the defendant Carlos
J. Valdez prior to obtaining said loan and as an
inducement to make said loan, submitted to plaintiff a written financial statement concerning his
financial condition, that said financia l statement
purportedly was represented to be a complete statement as to the said Carlos J. Valdez's financial
condition on March 21, 1957. That he represented
that he had no other debts than those aggregating
$2500.00 with the effect of inducing said loan and
the acceptance of said promissory note and chattel
mortgage, whereas in truth and in fact, the defendant Carlos J. Valdez knew he was indebted in an
a1nount aggregating more than $3800.00. R-18 and
19.
Plaintiff offered to introduce evidence that the
plaintiff relied upon the statement and did not know
it was false and if it had known it was false, it
would not have made the loan. The defendant then
stated by Mr. Dibblee "I am stipu'lating, your Honor
to the facts. Mr. Parkinson has sho\vn me the papers
that my client signed and he has made an investigation". R-20.
1

The facts stipulated were the facts alleged in
plaintiff's complaint. That the defendant Carlos J.
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Valdez secured the loan through a materially false
statement in writing and that the defendant Carlos
J. Valdez knew the statement was false, also that
the plaintiff did not know the statement was fa lse
and that 'the plaintiff relied upon the s'tatement and
if plaintiff had known the true facts, would not have
made the loan. The case was submitted entirely on
a poin't of law, to-wit: "The application of Section
17 of the Bankruptcy Act. ( 11 U. S. Code Annotated
Sec. 35)
POINTS INVOLVED
1

POINT I
CERTAIN DEBTS ARE NOT AFFECTED BY A DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY, AND THE LIABILITY
OR OBLIGATI'ON TO PLAINTIFF IS ·ONE ·OF TH·OSE.
II
'DHE EFFECT OF THE DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY IS DETERMINED IN THE FORUM WHERE
THE QUESTION ARISES.
P~OINT

POINT III
THE AUTHORITIES CITED BY THE DEFENDANT
DO NOT JUSTIFY 'OR SUSTAIN HIS P·OSITION.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
CERTAIN DE'BTS ARE NOT AFFECTED BY A DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY, AND THE LIABILITY
OR OBLIGATrON TO PLAINTIFF IS ONE ·OF TH·OSE.

There .are two secfions of the Federal Bankruptcy Act bearing on the problem. Section 14 (11
U.S. Code Annotated 3'2) while not directly involved
is of interest to aid in distinguishing objections to
4
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a discharge, from liabilities which are not affected
by a discharge in bankruptcy. Under Section 14 objec't1ons to a discharge are made directly to the
bankruptcy court and are part of the bankruptcy
proceedings. Objections are fi'led by any appropriate
party v1ho may be a creditor or other parties, or on
occasion by the referee in bankruptcy.
When objections are sustained, a discharge is
denied and the bankrupt does not receive a discharge
on any deb'ts, and all of bankrupt's liabilities remain
in fuJI force and effect. There is no su-ch thing· as
a split or partial discharge. Under 'this section a
denial of a discharge is equally effective as to all
debts and a rather serious penalty. However, even
to 'the party who has committed no acts tha't would
result in the denial of a dis-charge, Congress has
provided that even so quite a number of classes of
debts are not affected by the bankruptcy discharge
even though these debts are properly 'listed and a
discharge in bankruptcy is granted.
It is the plaintiff's con'tention that the debt
herein sued upon is one of those no't affected by a
discharge in bankruptcy. The debts not affected by
a discharge are set fotth in what is known as Section 17 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act.
Section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S. Code
Annotated 35) is as follovvs :
"Sec. 17 Deb'ts Not Affected by a Discharge. - a. A discharge in bankruptcy shall
5
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release a b.ankrupt from all of his provable
debts, except such as ( 1) are due as a tax
levied by the United States, the State, county,
district, or municipality in which he resides;
( 2) are liabilities for obtaining property by
false pretense or false representations, or for
willfull and malicious injuries to the person
or property of another, or for alimony due or
to become due, or for maintenance or support
of wife or child, or for seduction of an unmarried female, or for breach of promise of
marriage accompanied by seduction, or for
criminal conversation; ( 3) have not been duly
scheduled in time for proof and allowance,
with the name of the creditor, if known to the
bankrupt, unless such creditor had notice or
actual knowledge of the proceedings in bankruptcy; or ( 4) were created by his fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation
while acting as an officer or in any fiduciary
capacity; or ( 5) are for wages due to workman, clerks, traveling or city salesmen, or
servants, which have been earned within three
months before the date of commencement of
the proceedings in bankruptcy; or ( 6) are
due for moneys of an employee received or retained by his employer to secure the faithful
performance by such employee of the terms
of a contract of employment."
1

This seetion provides that the liabilities therein
set forth are not affecte·d by a discharge and co-ntinue exactly the same as though bankruptcy had
not been taken.
Bear in mind that a discharge in bankruptcy
does not ipso facto set up some new or different
6
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relationship, but only furnishes the bankrupt with
a defense to the enforcement of existing obligations.
Bankruptcy is a defense that must be pleaded and
if not pleaded, it is waived. Bankruptcy does not
wipe out the liabilities, but only gives the bankrupt
a defense to their enforcement. The ~liability or obligation continues and will support a new promise
to pay without consideration. If one of the taxing
uni'ts 1nentioned in Section 17, proceeds to enforce
the liability to it, and a discharge in bankruptcy is
pleaded as a defense 1 a determination is made that
this liability is one of those described in Section 17,
and is not affected by the discharge.
If a workman sues for wages and the discharge
in bankruptcy is pleaded, the workman shows the
vvages 'vere earned within three months prior to
the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy
and therefore the defense of bankruptcy does not
apply.
If an employee sues an employer for money and
the employer in turn pleads bankruptcy, the employee meets the affirmative defense of bankruptcy
by showing that the money he sues for was held by
the employer to secure the faithful performance of
the employee, and therefore the bankruptcy discharge is not a good defense.
When the defendant Valdez conducted his transaction with the plaintiff, a liability to that plaintiff
7
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was estab~ished. If that liability was not affected
by a discharge, then it remains the same as though
bankruptcy had not been taken.
In this case the plaintiff asserts a liability of
the defendants and sets forth what he claims that
liability to be, - this liability must be established
and proved by the plaintiff. One of the defendants,
Catlos J. Valdez, says ''Yes, tha:t is my liability but
I have a defense. I am no longer bound by that
liabili'ty because I have taken bankruptcy". Plaintiff then meets this affirmative defense by setting
forth that the defendant made false representations
to induce plaintiff to enter into this transaction and
therefore this debt is not affected by a discharge in
bankruptcy - the defense does ndt apply.
The first question then is "What was the bankrupt's liabili'ty to this creditor?" If th.at liability is
not affected by a discharge - then the liability is
exactly the same as though bankruptcy had not
occurred. The Bankruptcy Act, Section 17, does not
create a new or different liability but only provides
the existing liability is not affected a discharge.
Therefore the plaintiff in seeking to enforce the
liabili'ty must set it forth - first in order to determine what if any liability existed. This the plaintiff must do by setting forth the liability of the
bankrupt to the plaintiff and in proving and establishing that liability, as though bankruptcy had
8
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never occurred, but unless that liability was founded
upon false pretenses and fa'lse representations, it
would be affected by the discharge in bankruptcy.
Therefore, after setting forth the details of the
liability which if the court please, is and was the
exac't liability set forth in the contract with the
plaintiff, the plaintiff must then show why the
discharge is not a bar to the enforcement of this
liability. Were there no bankruptcy, I doubt if anyone would argue differently. They would readily
admit the bankrupt's liabili'ty was exactly what the
agreement or contract said it was. If that liability
is not affected by a discharge, then it remains the
same - but to avoid the defense or bar 'to the enforcement of this liability the false pretenses and
fa1se representations upon which that liability came
into existanee, must be shown, not 'to crea'te a new
or different cause of action, but to meet the affirmative defense set up by the bankrupt.
The discussion in many cases is that the false
represen'ta'tions or false pretenses that must be
shown (sometimes carelesly referred to as "fraud")
is not in conflict with this theory but supports it.
There are many cases to bear this out.. A careful consideration and full understanding of 'the prob'lem properly presented to the court has never resulted in a contrary decision. The case of Ohio Finance vs. Greatho~[se, 110 N.E. 2nd 805, is a concise,
9
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direct and clear dis'cussion of this point. In tha't
case a judgment was rendered for the plaintiff; and
the defendant prosecuted his appeal on questions
of law, much the same as the instant case. Quoting
from the case, the Court stated:
"The following questions material to a decision
on this a ppea'l are :"
"1. Did the discharge in bankruptcy relieve the ·defendant from 'liability on the note
set up in plaintiff's statement of claim, 'the
execution of the ndte by defendant being admitted, his discharge in bankruptcy having
been shown, wherein he listed this debt and
gave notice to the plaintiff; who made no objection to the discharge in the bankruptcy
court?.
"2. Did the plaintiff misconceive its
remedy and by filing its action on contract
instead o ftor't, thereby prec'lude itself from
pleading the defendant's tort by way of reply
to the defendant's answer, setting up the discharge in bankruptcy?"
"3. Could plaintiff attack in the municipal court, the bankruptcy discharge, or was
it required to seek relief in the bankruptcy
cour.t to set aside such discharge on the ground
of the alleged false pretenses and faise representations of the defendant?"
''We are of the opinion that the answers
to all of 'these questions are no longer debateable in view of the express provisions of the
Bankruptcy Act and the several decisions of
this court in which we follow the great weight
of au'thori'ty throughout the United States.
10
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Alt of these questions must be answered favorably to the plaintiff appellee."
The case of Argyle vs. J!acobs 87 N.Y. 110- 41
A.R. 351, is one of the early land mark cases on
this st1bject and in agreement with the above analysis. rt has never been overruled.
The above case is quoted at length in the case
of Gregory vs. Williams 105 Kan. 819, 189 Pac.
932 as follows:
"Fraud was set up in the reply, not as a
cause of action against the defendant but to
avoid the defense that had been pleaded * * *
the a~tion continues as an action on a promissory note. The reply did not constitute a departure from the cause of action alleged in
the bill of particulars.''
In Crespi & Co. vs. Griffin 132 Calif. App 562 23 Pac. 2nd 47, we find
"In the instant case, the obligation is on
a promisory note, fraud was included and inciden'tal 'to 'the creation of that obligation.
That incident was properly urged without
pleading to avoid the plea of a discharge in
bankruptcy".
Personal Finance of Waterbury vs. Robinson
27 N.Y. Sup. 2nd 6 - the court stated the question
was specifically passed upon in Argyle vs. Jacobs
87 N.Y. 110-41 A.R. 357.
''There as in 'the case a't bar, an ac'tion
was brought upon a pomissory note and no
fraud was alleged in the comp'laint. The an11
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swer, as here, set up as an affirmative defense
the discharge in bankruptcy. Upon the trial
the plainfi'ff was permitted to give evidence
tending to show that this debt was. created
by fraud of a bankrupt, which was the wording of the statute at that time. The Appellate
court held this to be proper and affirmed
the judgment for the plaintiff saying at page
113-87 N.Y., "but it is further contended
on the par't of the defendant's that the plaintiff cannot have the benefit of 'the limitation
contained in the Act of 1867 because he did
not base his cause of action upon the alleged
fraud, but upon the promissory note, making
no allusion to the fraud in his complaint. rt
is no't provided that no cause of action for
fraud shal'l be discharged, but that no debt
created by fraud shall be discharged. These
promisory notes were deb'ts of the defendants
and the plaintiff was induced by the fraud
of the defendants to sell goods to them an·d to
take their notes therefore and hence these
debts were created by their fraud wfthin the
meaning of the bankruptcy act. It is not needful that 'the plaintiff should allege the fraud
in h'is complaint, it was no part of his cause
of action. It was needful only for him to prove
tha't not as a part of his cause of action, but
as an answer to the affirmative defense set
up * * *. The claimant may sue, on contract
and if the discharge in bankruptcy is pleaded,
he may, in rebuttal, show that the debt was
created by fraud, not to change his cause of
action from contract to frau·d, but to prevent
its being disbarred by the discharge in bankruptcy."
1

In Personal Finance vs. Martinez 115 Fed. 2nd
12
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226 (lOth Circuit) - a carefu1 reading of this case
and a elementary mathematical computation will
show the liability was co-extensive with the terms
of the contract. This case shows a loan of $110.00
was made on April 5, 1939; a suit was filed October
18, 1939 for $150~00. This was allowed in the lOth
Circuit Court and this ease has never been overruled
and from an easy computation, it can be seen the
only way this liability could go from $110.00 to
$150.00 in that period of time would be to allow the
provisions of the contract to apply. In this case the
court allowed recovery tlnder the terms of the note
and the false pretense and false representations
avoided the defense of bankruptcy.
In Blackman vs. McAdams 11 S.W. 599, we
find:
'"fhis was an action on a promissory note
executed by defendant to plaintiff. The petition was an ordinary declaration on a note.
The answer set up defendant's discharge in
bankruptcy in the prop·er United States District Court. Plaintiff filed a reply to the
answer in which he alleged the note was a liability arising by reason of defendants false
pretense and false representations.''
''The first point made is that the matter
alleged in the reply should have been set up
in the petition. We think not. The answer set
up new matter in alleging defendant's discharge from the debt in bankruptcy. It was
then proper to plead, by way of reply, such
matter as put the case without the operation
of discharge.''
1
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In the case of Personal Industrial Loan Corporation vs. K~enneth Dixon Forgay 140 Fed. Sup. 473
- Judge Ritter made several observations, among
them stating the case overruled the Martinez case
which I have discussed above, these observations
were corrected by the lOth Circuit Court decision
in 'the same case foun·d in 230 Fed. 2nd 18. There
the court did not criticize the pleading of a note
liability, but held that no facts had been alleged to
show the liability was founded on false pretenses
and false representations. There can be no doub't
that if the allegations on the false pretense and fa'lse
representations had been made to show the actual
facts rather than conclusions, a recovery would have
been allowed on the no'te. I quote
"It is elementary 'that fraud must be alleged by distinctly ple'ading the facts constituting the fraud. Mere epithets or conclusions
or general charges * * * are not good unless
ac-companied with a statement of the facts
to sustain it * * * it is necessary to show not
on1y what the fraud was and that injury has
been sustained, but also the connection of the
fraud with the alleged damage, so that it may
appear * * * whether the one might have resulted directly from tl1e dther. No facts were
pleaded which if admitted or es tablished
would support a frau·d judgment."
Collier on Bankruptcy 13 Ed. 616
"In a suit on a note, if the defendant
pleads a discharge in bankruptcy, the plaintiff may set up fraud in his reply".
1

14
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Personal Finance Company of Providence vs.
Nichols 43 Atlantic 2nd 314-

"A debt created by fraud is not void but
voidable only and therefore a creditor may
assert both the debt and the fraud at the same
time so long as he asserts the fraud to avoid
not the debt but the discharge".
The bankruptcy act does not ·create some new
or different liability to the creditor, but only furnishes the bankrupt with a defense to the enforcement. When the defense is overcome by showing
false pretenses and false representations, the liability continues unaffected by the diseharge in bankruptcy. It was never intended that the doctrine of
election of remedies should be invoked to preclude
the introduetion of proof to counter a special defense.
In an annotation found in 133 A.L.R. 466, is
the following quotation:
"The defendant's position is, in effect,
that when the declaration is on a contract of
sa le and the plea is discharge in bankruptcy,
the replication of debt created by defendant's
fraud is bad, that an isue upon a traverse of
such replications is an immaterial issue and
a trial of such an issue, a mistrial * * * the
plaintiff declares upon a promise of defendants to pay for goods sold, an'd, if he maintains his action, he m'aintains it upon the contract of sale affirmed by him. When a party
has an election between two inconsistent rights
or remedies - for instance, when he can rely
1
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upon a contract, or renounce the contract
and rely upon fraud - and he has knowledge
of all facts material to be known in making
a choice, his selection of one may be renunciation of the other, but the plaintiff in this
case avers the fraud of the defendants, not as
the p l'aintiff's cause of action, but as a refutation of the defendants' alleged defense of
discharge. The plaintiff claims to recover
damage not for the defendant's fraud but for
the breach of his promise to pay for the good
bought, and in the replication, he alleges the
fraud, not as a ground upon which his action
rests, but to show there is no ground on which
the defendants discharge can be applied to
this debt * * * The statute recognizes the
debt created by the fraud of the bankrupt is
a debt not discharged and not affec'te,d by the
proceedings of bankruptcy, except so far as it
nTay be paid by .a dividend. So far as this
case is concerned, the debt, if created by the
fraud of the bankrupt, is excepted out of the
operation of the bankruptcy act. And when
the plaintiff answers the plea of discharge
by the replication of debt created by fraud,
he does not attempt to rescind or invalidate
or renounce the contract, bu't he affirms it,
and claims that the debt is a valid subsisting
debt. In the declaration he asserts the debt.
In the replication he asserts the same debt.
He avers the fraud, not to avoid the contract
himself, but to show that the defendant cannot avoid it; no't to show that by reason of
the fraud, the debt declared upon was never
created, but to show that being- created by
fraud, it was not discharged under the bankruptcy act; no't to show that there is no such
debt, but to show that there is such a debt
1
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notwithstanding the discharge. In this course
there is no inconsistency and the plaintiff is
not estopped to answer the plea of discharge
by the replication of debt created by fraud".
P'OINT II
THE EFFECT OF THE DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY IS DETERMINED IN THE FORUM WHERE
THE QUESTION ARISES.

This prob1em I believe has been adequately
settled for many years. However, until very recently there was one case that indicated an obligation
rested upon a creditor who had knowledge of facts
which would preclude a bankrupt from being discharged, to advise the bankruptcy cour:t thereof;
'that his failure to do so, would legally bar him from
maintaining a subsequent sui!t against 'the bankrupt.
In the case of Harold F. White vs. Pub\lic Loan Gorporation, 147 Fed. Rep. 2nd 601, decided I believe
in 1957, the court said:
"The Referee has based his dec'ision upon
the opinion and holding of Judge Reeves in
the case of In re: Walton D.C.W.D. Missouri
51 Fed. Sup. 857 - that case held, in a situation simillar to 'that here involved, that an
obligation rested upon a creditor who had
knowledge of any facts which would preclude
a bankrupt from being discharged, to advise
the bankruptcy court thereof, and on his failure to do so would legally bar h'im from maintaining a subsequent suit against the bankrupt related to his claim. Page 858. The
opinion further d~lared that the bankruptcy
court would also be equitably entitled, as a
17
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

mater of estoppel, to prevent such a creditor
from harvesting the fruits of his bad faith
scheme of allowing the debts of other creditors to be discharged and of leaving himself
with the advantage of being able to pursue
the bankrupt alone. Page 859.
'Hovv-ever desirable these results may
seem abstractly in relation to a bankruptcy
proceeding, we do not believe that the 'language of Section 14 and 17 of the Bankruptcy
Act, 11 U.So Code Annotated Sec. 32 and 35,
dealing with the granting of discharges and
the effect thereof, admits of the application
of any such qualifications or conditions.
"On the specificnese and detail with
vvhich Congress took pains to cover the granting of discharges under Section 17, we can
see no room for any implication that a creditor was to have a legal duty to advise the
bankruptcy court of any information he might
have which would preclude the bankrupt from
being discharged - much less for any inference of a legislative intent that, if he failed
to do so, he should be subject to the penalty
in relation to Section 14, of not being able
to maintain a suit against the ba11krupt upon
any debt he might have \vhich was excepted
from the operation of a discharge by Section 17.
"No more is there any room to append
such qua'lifications and conditions and penalty
to Section 17 itself. The exceptions provided
for in Section 17, such as liabilities for obtaining money or property by false pretenses
or false representations, are rights which Congress has chosen to exempt from bankruptcy
administration and consequences and to leave
1R
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standing infavor of creditors, the same as they
were before the bankruptcy proceedings. The
exemption is self executing and no decree of
the bankruptcy court is needed or is able to
give it establishment.
"We therefore think the Walton case is
wrong in its holdings that a bankruptcy court
is entitled to deprive a creditor of the benefit
of the excemption existing under Section 17,
on the basis of his having failed to file objection, or to communicate information to the
court, in relation to the bankrupt's discharge.
In this connection it may be noted that no
other reported decisions appear o h·ave followed the Wa'lton case. As one bankruptcy text
book authority has commented 'The decision
has absolutely no statutory basis to support
it and must be regarded as erroneous'. I Collier on Bankruptcy 14th Ed. Section 14-07
footnote 4, page 12'72."
POINT III
THE AUTHORITIES CITED BY THE DEFENDANT
DO NOT JUSTIFY OR SUSTAIN HIS P'OSITION.

The authorities cited by the defendant do not
justify or sustain his position. The case ci'ted by defendant, Personal Loan Co. vs. Forgay, decided by
District Judge Ritter in 140 Fed. Sup. 417, and by
the lOth Circuit Court in 230 Fed. 2nd 18, was a
case in a non-record court by default judgment without any indication or proof of false pretenses or
false representations. The complaint alleged only a
conclusion and the court held no false pretenses or
false representations had been pleaded or proved,
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and there were no Findings of Fact or Conclusions
of Law 'to indicate evidence had ever been taken in
that respect. We find in the decision of the Circuit
Court, the following:
''The power to enjoin proceedings in a
state court involving a debt listed in the bankruptcy proceeding or a judgment obtained on
such a debt in a state court during bankruptcy
proceedings or thereafter, is not an absolute
power and may be exercised only under such
condtions as appeal to the equitable conscience
of the court.
"A due regard to our dual system of court
requires a Federal Court to conclude that had
the debtor presented his defense that the debt
sued on in the state court was in fact dischargeable, the state court would have given
it the consideration it merited, or that if the
defense vvas offered and rejected by the state
court, that it acted in good faith and that
therefore the judgment was entitled to full
faith and credit * * * the default judgment it
obtained is merely for the amount of the clain1
and did not purport to be a fraud judgment.
~n fact the judgment did 11ot refer to fraud
In any way.
"Mere epithets, or conclusions, or genera'l
charges, are not good u11less accompanied with
a statement of facts to sustain it * * * it is
necessary to show not only what the fraud was
and that injury has been sustained, but also
the connection of the fraud with the alleged
damage, so that it may appear whether one
might have resulted from the other. No facts
were pleaded which if admitted or established
would support a fraud judgment."
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In the case of Beneficial L·oan Company vs.
Noble 129 Fed. 2nd 425; the Federal Court held that
federal courts would recognize the decisions and
judgments of the state cou~t. We find the following
quotation:
"A default judgment was entered, debtor
had consulted legal aid and was told to disregard the suit. On the hearing of the Order
to Show Cause (Why plaintiff should not be
enjoined) the referee found that 110 fraud was
practiced on the loan company when the second
loan was obtained, that the loan company did
not rely on the financial statement given when
the second loan was made * * *
"Here however, the bankruptcy court did
not undertake to exercise its juriS'diction with
respect to allowance, rejection, or subordination of a claim, but undertook to inquire into
'the meri'ts of the cause of action for fraud
upon which the state court's good judgment
was predicated. The decision of the referee
is therefore reversed.
In the case of Household FiThance Corporation
vs. Dunbar 262 Fed. 2nd 212; this case held that
the defendant waived the defense of bankruptcy by
failing to defend. On page 116 of the decision, we
find:
"Here Dunbar had 70 days within which
to set up the order of discharge as a defense
in the state court action. He failed to do so
and permitted judgment to go against him
by default. We reluctantly conclude that Dunbar waived his defense to the state court ac21
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tion and was not entitled to equitable relief
in the federal court''.
The quotation by defendant from this case is
dicta. The case does not deal in detail with the pleadings on the point covered in the quotation, there
appears to l1ave been no briefing on this point either
by the court or the counsel, nor a complete consideration of the statement. It was a gratuitous statement and not necessary to or part of the decision and
therefore the case does no't decide the point for
which defendant quoted it. In fact I have found no
case, either in the defendant's brief or out, that
has decided the point in favor of the defendant's
position.
The case of State Finance vs. Morrow 216 Fed.
Rep. 2nd 676 does not sustain the position of defendant. We find in the case:
"As a practical matter based upon the
realities of the judicial processes in a court
in which the issues are loosely passed, the
bankruptcy court is unab1e to determine with
any degree of satisfaction, whether the ultimate judgment of the court will be based upon
the debt for which the note was given or the
fraud which may have induced it. The coutt
n1ay well have 'taken judicial notice that the
court in which the liability was asserted was
not a court of record where issues of law and
fact are defined with any degree of particularity and that for all practical purposes the
bankrupt is defenseless~ It is these practical
considera'tions which prompt the bankruptcy
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courts to exercise their equitable powers. Indeed, it is these considerations which impose
upon them the inescapable duty to vouchsafe
the integrity of their decrees. The trial court
determined the adequacy of the remedy upon
the face of the complaint and concluded that
the appellants suit was upon the discharged
debt. We think the court was fully justified
in so doing * * * It will thus be seen the
'la'tter section ( * * * Section 17 subdivision a)
excepts liabilities for false pretenses and false
representations from discharge. Section 14,
subdivisionc 3 authorizes the withholding of
a discharge in its entirety on the grounds of
fraud. The two sections are not mutually exclusive or paria materia, but they have been
construed and administered to provide for
an expedicious discharge of all provable debts
and to leave the effect of a discharge to litigation in courts of competent jurisdiction where
the decree of discharge is pleaded as a defense
to a claim based upon liability ob'tained by
fraud and false pretenses * * * In short the
right to a discharge and the effeet of a discharge are entirely distinct propositions * * *.
The trial court's injunctive decree is based
squarely upon the philosophy of Local Loan
vs. Hunt 2·93 U. S. 2'34- 54 Sup. Ct. 695; and
Seaboard Finance vs. Ottinger 50 Fed. 2nd
856, at page 680.
The fact that the face of the complaint did not
se't forth facts showing that the debt was founded
upon or was induced by false pretenses and false
representations, was the controlling factor.
I do not believe the case of Kinnear et al vs.
Pro~~se .et al; 16 Pac. 2nd 1094- 81 Utah 135, is in
1
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point or is of any help in this case because the
points there discussed are not involved in 'the present case. The distinction between the instant case
before 'the court and the Kinnear case was amply
set forth in the annotation quoted above in 133
A.L.R. 466. It was never intended that the doctrine
of election of remedy should be invoked to preclude
the introduction of proof to counter a specia'l defense.
One other thing, if intention to deceive or conceal is necessary it is well established that this intend is supplied by 'the making of statements which
are knowingly fals.e or made with a reckless indifference to their truth or falsity. The burden is on
the bankrupt 'to prove that he has not given a materially false statement within the meaning of the
Bankruptcy Act where a cre'ditor has sho\vn reasonable grounds for believing tha't he has.
In Third National Bank vs. Smatlock, 99 Fed.
2nd 687, Page 689
"Where the objector has shown to the
satisfaction of the court 'reasonable grounds
for believing' the burden then shifts to the
bankrupt to prove that he has not committed
the acts charged".
In the instant case it has been admitted the
defendant made a materia~ly false statement inwriting; tha't he knew it was false and that the
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plaintiff relied on the statement and that the plaintiff believed it to be true, and would have conducted
himself differently if he had known the true fac'ts.
The plaintiff submits the judgment of the District Court was proper and should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
BARTLETT R. PARKINSON
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Respondent
502 Phillips Petroleum Bldg.
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